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INTRODUCTION 
Vis-à-vis the scarcity of resources (e.g. space dedicated to transport and 
public money) and the environmental implication of transport, the stake today 
is to implement new regulations in order to improve the transport system 
efficiency. According to the prescription of economic theory, several European 
and national documents advocate the introduction of more pricing instruments 
into the current regulation of the transport system as well as more efficiency 
into pricing, particularly through the principle of marginal cost pricing (cf. 
European Commission 1995 and 1998). 
The debate around these proposals is all the more sharp since the decisions 
about pricing and regulation in transport touch fundamental aspects of our 
society, such as liberty of travel, equity and non-discrimination, which cannot 
be left completely to the free market.  
The recent failures of some tolling schemes in French urban areas (e.g. in 
Lyon or Toulouse), the constant opposition of the opinion to the introduction of 
congestion pricing in spite of the intellectual seduction that this concept has 
exerted on the economists for more than 75 years, show that it is necessary to 
analyse the ways to make acceptable a more efficient transport policy.  
When one analyses the reactions of the various stakeholders to the 
documents previously quoted (PATS, 2000), in fact primarily questions of 
equity arise. They are as well questions of equal treatment between modes or 
operators, as of risk of aggravation of the inequalities between users or 
consumers, of concern of preservation of social and spatial solidarity at the 
various geographic levels, from local government to European level. The 
benefit and burden sharing coming from changes in transport policy is of 
course the main issue.  
First of all it should be underlined that there is no a theory of acceptability. A 
central assumption is that acceptability mostly relies on the two conditions of 
efficiency and equity: a policy measure that is perceived as insufficiently 
efficient and insufficiently fair is thus doomed to be rejected. The corollary of 
this assumption is that to be acceptable a transport policy must reach a 
minimal degree of efficiency and a minimal degree of equity. By saying that, it 
is stated that there is no identity between efficiency and fairness and that the 
first has not automatically implicit the second. In addition, these conditions are necessary though not sufficient to guarantee the acceptability of a pricing 
policy.  
In the first section we elaborate an analytical framework of acceptability which 
will be applied in the second section to a series of case studies. This 
application will help to validate the framework and infer relevant ways of 
improvement of acceptability of transport pricing schemes. 
1.  AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCEPTABILITY 
Firstly we recap the principles of optimal pricing and investment. Secondly we 
develop the analysis of equity through its various dimensions. Finally we 
elaborate the analytical framework of acceptability which combines these 
dimensions of efficiency and equity. 
1.1.  Efficiency: optimal pricing and investment 
Efficiency in its economic meaning relies on a rather solid theoretical basis: 
efficient pricing of transport infrastructure and public transport services is a 
necessary condition for maximising the social surplus, i.e. the sum of the 
producers' surplus and the consumers' surplus for all goods and services, on 
the side-condition that all external costs are internalised. In the case of 
transport infrastructure the short-run efficiency implies that the capacity is 
given, and the goal is to make the best use of the existing capacity. This 
implies that infrastructure use and public transport service should be in 
general priced on a social marginal cost basis. In the long-run the efficiency 
condition is that investments in transport infrastructure should be undertaken 
up to the point where benefits just exceed costs (Small, 1992a).  
However this result supposes inter alia that the remainder of the economy is 
at the optimum, i.e. prices, at least in the sectors of the economy related to 
the sector studied, are equal to the marginal costs, which is often not the 
case. The "second-best" theorem stipulates that in this case of non-optimality 
of the other sectors, pricing at marginal cost in a sector does not necessarily 
lead to an optimum in this sector and can even move it away from the 
optimum (Feldman, 1997). For example, if one cannot price urban public 
transport at marginal cost in an agglomeration, because of a constraint of 
costs coverage imposed for considerations of budgetary restriction, the pricing 
of car use at marginal cost will be inefficient. Indeed the cost coverage for 
urban public transport would imply a rise in the fares beyond the marginal cost 
of use, which would produce a social loss compared to the optimum: to avoid 
that, and in particular a shift of public transport users towards the car, the 
pricing of car use should also move away from its marginal cost.  
This theorem of the "second-best" thus seems to singularly weaken the 
theoretical prescription of marginal cost pricing. However that does not call 
into question the principle of pricing in itself. Several works show case by case 
- under-pricing of a competing mode or constraint of budget balance on a 
particular mode -, how pricing must deviate from marginal cost (Quinet, 1998). 
There is thus a consensus to judge that it is more efficient to charge 
something for congestion and environmental externalities, rather than to charge nothing or to charge a price a disconnected from the marginal cost. 
Concretely that means a pricing which varies with the degree of congestion or 
nuisances (accidents, noise, pollution) emitted by the various transport 
modes. Obviously this prescription comes up against considerations of equity.  
1.2.  How to characterise equity? 
On the opposite, there is a great diversity of conceptions of equity. The 
perception of the inequalities calls upon complex mechanisms of comparison, 
function of the objective inequalities but also many other variables. A 
difference is sometimes seen legitimate, sometimes illegitimate, whatever its 
objective extent. We must also underline that there is not a theory of equity 
but multiple meanings of the concept, resulting from the history of the human 
societies, or proposed by various social and human sciences, in particular 
philosophy or economics (Sen, 1987).  
Our approach of equity in transport consists in explicitly taking into account 
the inequalities of distribution of the goods, as proposed by Rawls in his 
theory of justice (1971). It consists in considering the principles of justice as 
being the subject of an original agreement in the society.  
The first principle called “principle of liberty”, and to which Rawls gives the 
priority, (“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with similar liberty for others”) relates to the civil rights of the 
person. The second principle, including efficiency and equity according to 
Rawls, relates to the allocation of resources between the individuals, namely 
(a) the famous “principle of difference” and (b) the principle of equality of 
opportunities.  
The theory of Rawls enables us to elaborate three dimensions of equity 
directly applicable to the transport field and its pricing. We define  
•  territorial equity, corresponding to the “principle of liberty”, in which the 
society must guarantee everywhere the access rights to the goods 
and the services;  
•  horizontal equity, corresponding to the “principle of equal opportunity”, 
which concerns the equal treatment between users and the user-pays 
principle (be it for a “bad” i.e. congestion or nuisances or for a “good” 
i.e. better service);  
•  vertical equity, corresponding to the “principle of difference”, which 
explicitly takes into account the inequalities and its consequences as 
regards transport.  
Litman (1997) previously evoked two types of equity, horizontal equity and 
vertical equity, without explicitly binding them to the theory of Rawls. We 
distinguish in addition territorial equity, because of the specificity of transport 
which conditions accessibility at the various points in space.  
1.3.  The analytical framework of acceptability 
Some contradictions were raised between these various dimensions and with 
the objective of economic efficiency (see Figure 1).   
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Figure 1 : Relationships between equity dimensions and efficiency 
The economic efficiency and the horizontal equity can each one involve price 
increases going against vertical equity (attention paid to those most 
penalised). Conversely, vertical equity requires mechanisms of redistribution 
or compensations which challenge the economic efficiency of pricing and the 
user-pay principle of horizontal equity.  
The economic efficiency and the horizontal equity can also each one involve 
price increases going against territorial equity, by challenging the right to 
mobility. Conversely, the preservation of this right requires investments and 
imposes limits on the prices, being likely to challenge the economic efficiency 
of pricing and the user-pays principle of horizontal equity.  
Finally the economic efficiency (marginal cost pricing) and the user-pays 
principle of horizontal equity are generally incompatible because marginal and 
average costs are mostly different (Roy, 1998). However some compatibility 
can be found within the framework of “transport funds”: horizontal equity is not 
required any more for each mode or each infrastructure but from the point of 
view of a transport service, within the perimeter of the transport funds.  
The implementation of changes in transport pricing implies to apply 
longitudinally this framework, according to the four entries of economic 
efficiency and equity:  
•  Economic efficiency implies changes in pricing, including pricing 
something that was previously perceived as “free”. Some actors may 
consider themselves as losers, i.e. perceive a degradation of their own situation, when compared to the period before the 
implementation of the new pricing measure (e.g. “I pay more than 
before without drawing from it more benefit”). Reluctance to such 
price increase can be in some cases overcome if higher quality or 
capacity is delivered. However pricing changes may conflict with the 
following equity dimensions. 
•  Territorial equity or principle of liberty, implies the free exercise of the 
right to mobility of the people and the goods. On the one hand the 
maintenance of this freedom imposes obvious limits on the increase in 
transport pricing, and on the other hand this freedom remains 
contained within the limits of the general interest of the society.  
•  Horizontal equity or user-pays principle, implies a better coverage of 
the costs by the users. However with pricing changes implied by this 
equity principle some actors concerned may consider themselves as 
losers, comparatively to the others (e.g. “I pay more than the others 
with regard to the costs that I inflict and to the advantages that I bring 
to the society”).  
•  Vertical equity or principle of maximisation of the situation of most 
penalised groups or areas, implies that any policy which is likely to 
worsen the situation of the least advantaged groups or the least 
served areas, or even which openly does not aim at an improvement 
of these situations, is very likely to be rejected. It results from this that 
the principles of allocation of revenues from pricing play, by their more 
or less distributive character, a central role in the acceptability of 
pricing.  
These three dimensions of equity are indivisible from the perception of the 
fairness of a transport policy. They are also related to the criterion of 
economic efficiency, which cannot be durably ignored. This set of 
contradictory constraints thus forms the framework of definition and 
management of transport policies, which aim at being both equitable and 
efficient. It results from these incompatibilities that one will obtain at best only 
an imperfect compromise between the economic efficiency and these three 
dimensions of equity.  
2. APPLICATION 
The previous analytical framework of acceptability is then applied to a series 
of four case studies which are exemplary of often controversial 
implementation of road user charging in urban or suburban areas. 
2.1.  SR 91 Express lanes (California) 
The State Road 91 is a 2 x 4 lanes section of freeway in Orange County. It is 
located in an extremely congested commuter route connecting the 
employment centers of Orange and Los Angeles Counties with rapidly 
growing eastern suburbs (congestion occurs between 4:00 a.m and 8:00 a.m 
and between 3:00 p.m and 7:00 p.m). The introduction of “Express Lanes”, in 
December 1995, is an implementation of congestion pricing with a new-capacity toll road. This system added two lanes in each direction in the 
median strip of the existing freeway along a 16-km stretch in Orange County 
(Garnier, 1998).  
The cost of the road was $126 million (1 USD ≅ 1 Euro), including the 
technology component, and privately financed. Prices are not regulated but 
the corporation is limited to a maximum internal rate of return, with any excess 
revenues going to State and local highway projects (Small and Gomez-
Ibanez, 1998). 
While the original freeway lanes remain free, the Express lanes are tolled, 
except for motorcycles and high-occupancy vehicles with three or more 
passengers. Heavy trucks are excluded. Technology is based on a windshield 
transponder that automatically collects tolls. This makes easier a flexible 
congestion pricing mechanism (in the initial phase, there were 5 preset toll 
levels between $0.25 and $2.50, these have been extended to 9 levels in 
1998). Moreover drivers are informed onboard on the current price (provided 
that they have the transponder). They also have the time to decide to use the 
toll road at each of the three entry points during one-and-a-half miles of road. 
2.2.  The cordon toll of Trondheim (Norway)  
Since the Eighties the Norwegian agglomeration of Trondheim (250.000 
inhabitants) has undergone the problems of a growing traffic (approximately 
50% of the traffic was through traffic) and the lack of financial resources to 
improve the road system. In September 1991, a cordon toll was set up around 
the center of the city, i.e. a 4km by 6km area, containing 40,000 inhabitants 
and many business and administrative units as well as the port (Norwegian 
Public Roads Administration, 1999).  
The main aim is to generate revenues to finance the improvement of the 
transport infrastructures, jointly with governmental funds. This explains why 
the level of toll is low and varies little during the day. The capital spending 
program in transport was estimated at 2,2 billion NOK (1 NOK ≅ 0.12 Euro) 
over a 15 years period, with a planned contribution of 60% by the toll receipts. 
The town council also decided that 20% of the toll receipts would go to public 
transport and the improvement of safety and environment (pedestrians, 
cyclists).  
The cordon toll imposes a payment on each passage inbound. Toll was 
initially collected on 12 points which control all the entries to the center. Toll 
operates from 6 am to 5 pm and the price is higher in morning peak hours (6 
am to 10 am). The access is free in the evening and the weekend. Upon the 
departure the system was designed to function with the technology of 
automatic identification and debiting of the vehicles and a marketing policy to 
promote the onboard unit makes that more than 90% of the vehicles pass the 
cordon without stopping.  
The basic price was 12 NOK in 1999. For a subscriber by prepayment of 
5,000 NOK, the reduction amounts 60% in off-peak hour against 40% in peak 
hour. These reductions are respectively 40% and 20% for prepayment of 500 
NOK. The price is doubled for the heavy vehicles. The access is free for the 
motor bikes. The border effects are limited by the fact that the driver who crosses several times the cordon will pay to the maximum only one time per 
hour or 60 times per month (that relates to only 5% of the users).  
A third of the drivers lived inside the initial cordon and thus paid toll rarely 
whereas they benefited from the system. For reasons of equity and the need 
to increase the receipts, the cordon was redesigned in 1998 with 21 collecting 
points, so as to affect a greater part of the traffic.  
2.3.  Motorway A1 in North of Paris (France) 
Autoroute A1 is a toll motorway connecting Paris to Lille, about 200 km to the 
north. The A1 is subject to heavy inbound traffic near Paris on Sunday 
afternoons and evenings.  
In April 1992, a time-varying toll scheme has been implemented for Sundays 
only: this is a modulation of the existing flat toll (52 FF in 1992 from Lille to 
Paris; 1 FF = 0.15 Euro). The objective was to spread the peak demand. 
A « red tariff » 25 percent higher than the normal toll  is charged during the 
Sunday peak period (16:30-20:30). A « green tariff » 25 percent lower than 
the normal toll is charged before (14:30-16h30) and after the peak (20:30-
23:30). These hours and rates were designed so that total revenues are 
nearly identical to those collected with the normal toll (EUROTOLL, 1999). 
2.4.  The Northern ring road of Lyon (France) 
The Northern ring road of Lyon is a toll road infrastructure with an overall 
length of 10 km, including a viaduct and three tunnels. It prolongs an existing 
free ring road in the East, by-passes by the North the heart of the 
agglomeration while passing through an already very urbanised area: that 
explains why about two thirds of the infrastructure are underground. The total 
cost of the operation rose in 1997 to 6 billion FF, of which a little more than 
half (52%) were financed by the public funds (interchanges and subsidies to 
the concessionaire). The remainder was to be initially covered by the tolls. 
The contract of concession also envisaged the reduction of capacity of parallel 
existing free roads.  
The infrastructure opened in August 1997 and caused upon the departure a 
significant movement of refusal on behalf of the drivers. Indeed they 
discovered at the same time the new infrastructure with toll and the 
restrictions on the parallel free roads: the indications and the technical 
configuration of the Eastern ring were thought to direct the traffic in the new 
Northern toll infrastructure. A burst of boycott of the new infrastructure started, 
accompanied by demonstrations each week at the toll barriers, preventing the 
payment by the users, and sometimes with destruction of these barriers. In 
parallel, because of lawsuit by the opponents to this toll emerged (a) first of all 
in September 1997 a partial re-establishment of the capacity of free flow on a 
parallel boulevard, then (b) a cancellation of the private concession by the 
Supreme Court in the beginning of 1998.  
After the cancellation, the motorway has been run by a public agency (régie) 
and the tolls have considerably been reduced by decision of the Mayor. Only the central tunnel (3.5 km) is now tolled and the price has been reduced to 
10FF. 
2.5. Synthesis   
Table 1 synthesises the evaluation of the economic efficiency and equity 
dimensions for the four case studies which were described previously.  
A horizontal reading of Table 1 makes it possible to evaluate how each 
dimension of equity is declined in the various cases studies. 
The best economic efficiency is obtained by the modulation of an existing toll 
(cf. A1). However a "second best" solution can be obtained in certain cases of 
financing tolls (cf. SR91 and Trondheim), which represent a compromise 
between economic efficiency (i.e. to charge the avoidance of congestion) and 
horizontal equity (i.e. to cover the costs while offering a service).  
Improving horizontal equity through an explicit counterpart is not always 
enough to counterbalance other negative effects, in particular on vertical and 
territorial dimensions of equity, as shown by the example of Téo. A contrario 
the counterpart can be limited (limited fluidity of the traffic on peak hours in the 
A1 case) but the redistribution of the receipts between peak and off-peak 
users without additional receipts for the operator, makes it possible to 
maintain horizontal equity in the view of the users.  
Vertical equity constitutes an obvious stumbling block when quasi-obligation 
to pay and high price combine as in the Téo case. A contrario a moderate 
price and a partial redistribution can be accompanied by an obligation to pay 
(cf. Trondheim). Another way of improving this vertical equity consists, in the 
case of a congestion toll, to offer an obvious compensation to those who 
accept to change their travel schedule (cf. A1).  
Territorial equity is generally likely to be degraded or only maintained when 
additional pricing is introduced on transport infrastructures. Here again a 
combination of a quasi-obligation to pay and a high price calls strongly into 
question the territorial equity. To avoid this price increase must be moderate 
as indicated by the example of Trondheim.  
A vertical reading of Table 1 makes it possible to evaluate through each case 
study how the various dimensions of efficiency and equity enter into synergy.  
The case of Téo shows how a measure of restriction of the parallel free roads 
has a negative effect simultaneously on three dimensions of equity: these 
negative effects feed themselves reciprocally to contribute to the rejection of 
this scheme. It was however a necessary measure to guarantee a minimal 
flow of paying users and thus ensure the financial balance of the project.  
A contrario the SR 91 case shows that there may exist some combinations of 
financial cost of infrastructure and price attracting sufficient customers (i.e. 
rather rich, having a value of time justifying the toll payment for the saving of 
time they get), authorising a financially balanced operation: thus horizontal 
equity is maintained (costs coverage) and even made more acceptable 
(counterpart) without calling into question vertical and territorial dimensions of 
equity as in the Téo case. Such schemes are also a good compromise with 
the economic efficiency when they make pay (the avoidance of) congestion.   
    Téo - Lyon     SR91 - California     Trondheim - Norway     A1 – North of Paris  
Economic 
efficiency  
−  − Toll on bypass whereas 
more significant nuisances 
in the center  
+ modulation according to 
congestion  
++  + Toll for the avoidance of 
congestion (~second-best 
solution)  
+ elaborate modulation 
according to congestion  
+   + Toll to finance the future 
investments (~ to avoid the 
future congestion)  
slight peak pricing 
modulation  
++  Peak tolling (modulation of 
an existing financing toll)  
Horizontal equity  −/ =   − Costs coverage by the 
users < 50%  
+ counterpart  
− drivers of certain sectors 
of the agglomeration 
forced to pay 
(discrimination)  
++  + Infrastructure costs 
totally covered by the 
users  
+ counterpart  
+   − costs partially covered by 
the users  
+ the maximum of the 
drivers  are affected (non-
discrimination) 
+ (future) counterpart  
=   + Costs coverage by toll is 
ensured as before (no 
additional receipts for the 
operator)  
− limited counterpart (slight 
fluidity at the peak hours)  
Vertical equity   −  Restrictions of capacity on 
parallel free roads, hence 
increase in the user costs 
without alternative for the 
economically fragile 
classes  
=   No restriction on the 
existing free road, 
therefore no direct 
incidence  
= / +   − No alternative to toll for 
the drivers  
+ moderate price  
+ redistribution of part of 
the receipts towards public 
transport  
= / +  + Redistribution of the 
receipts between users  
− Possible captivity vis-a-
vis the schedules but 
limited (weekend returns)  
Territorial equity  −−  Restrictions of capacity on 
parallel free roads  
=   No restriction on the 
existing free road  
−  Initially border (cordon), 
effects but moderate price 
=   No amendment  
(+ +, +, =, − −− is a notation of the " after " situation compared with the " before " situation)  
Table 1  
 The case of Trondheim represents a generalisation of the previous principle, 
where one seeks on an agglomeration level to solve the problem of cost 
coverage: a wide multi-cordon toll makes it possible to affect the maximum of 
drivers (horizontal equity) while guaranteeing a future counterpart; a moderate 
price and a partial redistribution of the receipts towards public transport avoid 
the pitfalls of territorial and vertical dimensions of equity.  
The case of the modulation of toll on the motorway A1 represents a good 
example of economic efficiency to manage the congestion. This modulation is 
made possible because (a) it starts from the existence of a flat toll to which 
the users are accustomed, (b) the price in off-peak hour is lowered, thus 
offering a compensation to those who agree to modify their hour of travel, and 
(c) the redistribution of the receipts is carried out between motorists without 
additional profit for the operator. However this pricing scheme is not applied 
on weekdays.  
The argumentation of this analysis shows the ways according to which the 
chances of success of urban traffic charging schemes could be increased.  
Toll on new roads applies only to the areas where, taking into account the 
price imposed by the costs of construction of the new infrastructures, there 
exists sufficient customers ready to pay: that is shown for instance by the SR 
91 case in the rich Orange county in California (and also the toll tunnel Prado-
Carénage in the centre of Marseilles), and a contrario by the failure of Téo in 
Lyon.  
However, even in these cases of possible application, there is still the 
importance of the network effects in an urban area: the drivers who drive 
through the toll roads free the capacity of other roads for other drivers. An 
efficient pricing scheme is likely better to be designed on the agglomeration 
level and not on particular links.  
Whenever toll on new roads is impossible, because the potential customers 
are insufficient given the construction costs, the need for cost coverage is 
added to the existence of the network effects previously evoked, to justify a 
mutual costs coverage by all the drivers on the agglomeration level: this 
follows the example of Trondheim toll. Moreover the treatment on the same 
level of all the drivers of the agglomeration makes it possible to improve 
horizontal equity between them.  
The toll modulation according to the charge of traffic, first step towards the 
economic efficiency, is accepted when it is accompanied by a tangible 
counterpart (e.g. SR91) or an obvious compensation like a reduced toll 
compared to an existing basic toll (example of A1).  
The short or medium term captivity of the households regarding the relative 
locations of their residence and their employment makes that the increase in 
the user transport costs cannot be too abrupt and that visible alternatives 
must be offered, in order to conform to the criteria of vertical and territorial 
equity.  CONCLUSION  
We have thus worked out an analytical framework of the acceptability of 
pricing changes in the transport sector. This framework combines the 
dimensions of economic efficiency (to manage the demand efficiently), 
territorial equity (guarantee of accessibility), horizontal equity (user-pays 
principle), and vertical equity (welfare of most underprivileged).  
The application of this framework was validated on some urban or suburban 
road toll case studies. The analysis showed that these dimensions of 
efficiency and equity generally reinforce themselves in their negative or 
positive aspects. This analysis also showed that these various dimensions of 
equity cannot be ignored on pain of failure. Moreover the ways according to 
which the acceptability of urban road user charging could be improved, if not 
guaranteed, were identified.  
In a more general way, a possible strategy consists in starting from the couple 
horizontal equity – economic efficiency around which the controversies 
between public authorities, operators and users are established. These 
controversies can be solved through the concept of transport funds, which 
combines the principles of efficient pricing and costs coverage, in a perimeter 
defined by a given area (e.g. an urban centre) or relation (e.g. a corridor), and 
a set of transport modes. The two former principles would form the heart of 
the specification of such transport funds. Regarding equity the vertical 
(maintenance of social cohesion) and territorial (maintenance of space 
cohesion) dimensions would be added to this specification, but with a political 
and financial commitment of the public authorities to cover the additional costs 
which would result from this addition.  
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